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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v- Case No. 18976 
FRED VELARDE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEllENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Fred Velarde, appeals his conviction for 
Theft, a Second Degree Felony, ntah Code Ann. 
El 76-6-412( 1) (a), ( 1953) as amended, in the Second Judicial 
District Court in and for Morgan County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was found guilty of Theft in a jury trial 
held November 16, 1982 in the Second Judicial District Court 
of Morgan County, the Honorable J. Duffey Palmer, Judge, 
presiding. Appellant was sentenced to serve one to fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the conviction below. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the early morning hours of October 1, lg82, John 
Pentz, a resident of Morgan, Utah, arrived in Salt Lake City 
with his brother (R.94-9S). Petz's brother went into the 
Western Club on Redwood Road in Salt Lake City, hut Pentz wac 
refused admission because he did not have proper 
identification (R.95, 103). 
Pentz walked down the street to the 7-11 store. 
Pentz testified that while he was there appellant_ drove into 
the parking lot of the store in a yellow pickup truck 
(R. 95-96, 105-106). Although appellant appeared to be drunk, 
Pentz asked appellant whether he would give him a ride to the 
freeway so that Pentz could hitchhike home because Pentz 
believed his brother planned to stay the night in Salt Lake 
City (R.96, 106-107). Appellant asked Pentz where he was 
going. Pentz replied, "Morgan." Appellant then, according to 
Pentz' s testimony, offered to drive Pentz to Morgan because 
appellant had nothing else to do (R.96, 107). 
Pentz futher related at trial that as they drove 
appellant told him he had been "partying" and that he had hit 
a telephone pole or two (R.98). After appellant exited the 
freeway at the Morgan turnoff, appellant began to weave back 
and forth across the road. Approximately five miles outside 
of Morgan, appellant passed out and slumped over on the seat. 
Pentz testified that he grabbed the steering wheel and pulled 
the truck over to stop at the side of the road. Pentz then 
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got out of the pickup truck, walked around to the driver's 
side, slid appellant over to the passenger side of the cab, 
and drove the truck toward Morgan (R.98, 109-110, 114-115). 
As Pentz drove to Morgan, appellant opened his coat, 
and Pentz saw that appellant was bloody. Appellant told Pentz 
that he had been stabbed, then added, "I hope you know you're 
drivin' a hot truck" (R.99, 110). Pentz drove the truck into 
Morgan and parked in front of the Country Cafe on Main Street. 
Pentz then telephoned the Sheriff's Office from a telephone 
booth in front of the cafe (R.99-100, 112). 
Morgan County Deputy Sheriff Vincent Nelson 
responded to the call at approximately 2:30 a.m. on October 1, 
1982 (R.100, 112, 116-117). Pentz related to Deputy Nelson 
what had happened (R.102, 117). Deputy Nelson walked over to 
the pickup truck and observed appellant lying on the seat of 
the cab, his head toward the driver's side (R.117). Deputy 
Nelson noted the license number of the pickup truck and 
initiated a stolen vehicle check through dispatch. Deputy 
Nelson then rapped on the window of the pickup truck for two 
minutes in an effort to arouse appellant. Appellant 
eventually responded (R.118, 125). As appellant got out of 
the truck he recognized that Deputy Nelson was a law 
enforcement officer, and appellant immediately went into a 
search position against the side of the truck without any 
prompting by Deputy Nelson (R.118-119). 
After Deputy Nelson frisked appellant, Deputy Nelson 
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took him to the patrol car. Dispatch informen Deputy Nelson 
that the pickup truck had been stolen from the Port lanCI CPrie> 1,, 
Company in Salt Lake C:ity (R.119). Deputy Nelson then pl.11" 1 
appellant under arrest and arlvised him of his riciht 1; 
(R.120). Deputy Nelson asked appellant whether he owned he 
vehicle. Appellant said, "No." (R.21.). The officer next 
asked appellant who did own it. Appellant replied he rlirl not 
know. Deputy Nelson then asked appellant how he had come to 
Morgan. Appellant told him that he had come in the truck, but 
appellant was apparently unaware that he was in Morgan 
(R.121). Deputy Nelson testified that he asked appellant 
other questions, but appellant was unable to provirle much 
information. Nelson recalled at trial that appellant appeared 
to be intoxicated (R.121). 
Appellant was charged with Theft and tried by jury 
on November 16, 19R2 in the Second Judicial District Court of 
Morgan County, the Honorable ,1. Duffy Palmer presiding. At 
trial appellant contended that he had been picked up while 
hitchhiking from Redwood Road to his residence at 100 South 
200 East in Salt Lake City (R.135-137). According to 
appellant, the driver, presumably State's witness Pentz, 
passed appellant's residence and drove toward Morgan on 
Interstate 15. Appellant claims he passed out on the way to 
Morgan (R.137). 
On cross-examination the prosecutor, over 
appellant's objections, asked appellant whether he had told 
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his version of the facts to Deputy Nelson at the time of his 
arrest or to any other person before trial. Appellant had not 
(R.92, 94, 96; See Appendix A). The prosecutor also mentioned 
in his closing argument appellant's failure to relate his 
exculpatory story before trial (R. 104-105, 109-110; See 
Appenclix A). 
Appellant was found guilty of Theft and sentenced to 
serve one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROSECUTOR'S REFERENCES TO APPELLANT'S 
FAILURE TO RELATE HIS EXCULPATORY STORY 
BEFORE TRIAL WERE PERMISSIBLE BECAUSE 
APPELLANT WAS NOT SILENT. 
Appellant contends that the prosecutor's references 
to appellant's failure to relate his exculpatory story before 
trial violated his right to a fair trial. The United States 
Supreme Court in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), cited by 
appellant, said, "We hold that the use for impeachment 
purposes of petitioners• silence, at the time of arrest and 
after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.• Id. at 619. This Court 
followed Doyle in State v. Wiswell, Utah, 639 P.2d 146 (1981). 
However, Doyle is not applicable where, as here, the 
defendant has not remained silent. In United States v. Agee, 
597 F.2d 350 (3d Cir. 1979), the court said: 
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The Supreme Court has described [the right 
to silence] as "the right to remain silent 
unless he chooses to speak in the 
unfettered exercise of his own will." The 
rationale which the Supreme Court adopted 
for its decision in Doyle was that it is 
fundamentally unfair--rorthe prosecution 
to impose a penalty at trial on a 
defendant who has exercised that right by 
choosing to remain silent. The very 
statement of that rationale demonstrates 
that Doyle can have no application to a 
case TnWFlich the defendant did not remain 
silent. 
Id. at 355 (footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court of Maine in 
State v. Kane, 432 A.2d 442 (Me. 1981), stated: "Once a 
defendant decides to speak, her failure to speak in 
exculpation cannot be explained away as a response to Miranda 
warnings." Id. at 444. The Maine supreme Court went on to 
quote Vitali v. United States, 383 F.2d 121, 123 (1st Cir. 
1967): 
A defendant cannot have it both ways. If 
he talks, what he says or omits is to be 
judged on its merits or demerits, and not 
on some artif ical standard that only the 
part that helps him can be later referred 
to. This was not a case where the 
government commented upon . . a prior 
exercise of rights. The government asked 
the jury to measure what the defendant 
said when he had no rights because he had 
voluntarily waived them. 
The United States Supreme Court has also recognized that Doyle 
is inapplicable in such situations. In 
447 U.S. 404 (1980), the Court said: "But Doyle does not 
apply to cross-examination that merely inquires into prior 
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inconsistent statments. Such questioning makes no unfair use 
of silence, because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after 
receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain 
silent." Id. at 40R. 
In the instant case appellant was not silent after 
being advised of his Miranda rights. Deputy Nelson asked 
appellant several questions concerning his presense in the 
stolen pickup truck. Appellant voluntarily responded to each 
(R.120-121). Thus, Doyle is 
The prosecutor impeached trial story by 
use of appellant's prior inconsistent statements. The 
prosecutor contrasted Deputy Nelson's testimony that appellant 
stated at the time of his arrest that he could not remember 
anything relating to his presence in the stolen pickup truck 
with the fact that six weeks later at trial appellant claimed 
to remember exculpatory facts explaining his presence in the 
truck (R. 92-93, 103-104, 110; See Appendix A). 
Furthermore, where a defendant claims, as here, to 
be a victim and not the perpetrator of the criminal conduct 
charged, it is permissible for the prosecutor to attempt to 
show that the defendant's actions and responses were not the 
usual actions and responses of a victim. State v. Taylor 
223 Kan. 261, 574 P.2d 210 (1977). Thus, the prosecutor 
properly commented on appellant's taking the search position 
against the truck immediatley upon recognizing that Deputy 
Nelson was a law enforcemtent officer and on apellant's 
-7-
,' 
failure to protest his innocence in his voluntary responses h 
Deputy Nelson's questions. 
CONCLUSION 
The prosecutor did not impermissibly comment on 
appellant's exercise of his right to silence because appellant 
was in fact not silent. The prosecutor merely impeached 
appellant's exculpatory trial story by use of appellant's 
prior inconsistent statements and by noting the inconsistency 
between appellant's trial story and his actions and responses 
at the time of his arrest. Therefore, appellant was not. 
denied a fair trial, and the conviction should be affirmed. 
1983. 
RESPECTFULLY SURMITTED this day of October, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
"'ii:i?; 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy 
of the foregoing Rrief of Respondent, postage prepaid, to 
Bernard L. Allen, Attorney for Appellant, 2568 Washington 
Blvd., Ogden, Utah, 84401, this of October, 1983. 
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APPENDIX A 
This appendix contains the challenged portion of the 
prosecutor's cross-examination of appellant as well as the 
comrlete closing and rebuttal argument of the 




A. v:ell let me ei:olain 'Alhat har·De:.ed. 
CCU?T: You have to just 
TPF Will 
-- to oet jy the car 
You are in a lot of just 
talking. You answer the That's the reason that you 
have this rr.an :iere. Just ans1•er and then he 1 a-sk Joi; • 
questions so rou can qet it in. 
lO I recall that. 
11 I the ccurt, you don't control· 
12 the co;;rt. 
!> .• All risht. 
Tt:-=- ask vou ".?ues-f:ions, 
15 <;1uestions. 
16 A. Yes, sir. 
17 (5y vr. vou ao into a 
U search position a9ainst the vehicle. 
19 A. Yes, I air.. 
20 Q. are yOl'. te2.lin0 that you di6 that because 
ll Of!icer '.:elson told you to or because he tell you to? 
22 A. Because he told rne that I under arrest. 
23 O'<ay, so ';here is else remenber. 
24 '.''o1; yoL·r is th3t Mr. Pent:" 
lb stole this vehicle, isn't it? 
. 
HAL R. REES 
Office: 867·2211 Registered Professional Reporter Res: 829·3976 
1 A. I don't know if he did or not. 
2 0. Well come on, Mr. Velarde, your position very cleJrl 
3 is that Pentz should 00 here exolaining hm·1 'le -,c,•c thi:lt 
4 vehicle, right? 
5 A. I don't know if he, if he stole it or not. Don't 
6 even know the car was stollen. 
7 0. Mr. Velarde, on that evening, why dirin't Y?U 
8 Officer-Nelson your si1e of the story? , 
9 MR. ALLEN: I will object. I will object. The 
10 has a right not to talk to an officer. 
11 COURT: is overruled, he can answer 
12 \1hy he diC..'"1' t if he didn't want to. 
13 A. 'cause he read rny Miranda rights anrl I felt that 
14 I didn't have to answer him any questions that would out my, 
15 that uould be used against me in a court of law. 
16 Q. Mr. Velarde, haven't you repeatedly tol1 Mr. Nelson 








Well that's just like not talkin' to him. 
0. Now but, Mr. Velarde, have you rereatedly told 
Mr. Nelson upon direct questioning from him you not, that 
you didn't want to talk because of your legal rights, but 
simoly you couldn't remember anything? 
A. I remember when he come and pounded on the window, 
25 well I didn't remember when he come ooundin' on the windo1-1, 
HAL R. REES 
Office: 867·2211 Regis1ered Professional Reporter Res. 829·3976 
r 
I 
when I woke up, I remember him standin' out there and tellin' 
me to come out of the car. And Prior tothat, I remember hitch-
hikin' from that bar, Farrel's? 
Did you or you now at the time Officer Nelson 
u?on questioning from him, tell him 'Why you were in the truck, 
where the truck came from? 
A. No, I did not. 
That you couldn't remember anything? 
A. No, I did not. 
lO So to that extent you are qoing to say that Officer 
ll testimony is incorrect and your testimony is correct? 
MR. ALLEN: I will object, Your Honor. I don't recal 




MR. PATTERSON: It's in the record, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I don't recall it being that way either, 
but it's easy to varify. 
18 
19 
MR. ALLEN: I object that it's 
THE COURT: Well the objection is sustained on the 
20 form of the questions. 
21 Mr. Velarde, did you, or did Officer ask you 
22 where you got the truck? 
A. 
25 A. 
No, he never. 
Did he ask you why you were in the truck? 
I don't think he asked me any of that. 
HAL A. REES 










1 Q. And to any questions that Officer 11clson riay havP 
2 asked you about where the truck cane from, or how y0u !lldy !1 l 
3 got it, or what you had been doino with it, you c1nn 
1 t rer.lc1.1Lc t 
4 him asking you any questio;-is of that nature? 
5 A. It's I don't know, it kind of lays in ny hea::. 
6 I was pretty high that night in, ahh, I don't know. 
7 Q. And is it your- oosition, Mr. Velar.-,e, that, do I 
8 understand your testimony correctly, is that you chose not 






So you have elected to qo forward with this entire 
12 criminal prosecution, be arrested for vehicle theft, and wait 
13 until today for the first time to give your version of what 
14 ha.ppened? 
15 MR. ALLEN: Your Honor, I will object to the question 
16 Anyone arrested under t!-:e law has the right not to soeak. 
17 THE COURT: I can't even hear you. I Ca!1 1 t year you! 
18 I can't hear you, Mr. Allen. (Note: Mr. Allen was not standing. 
19 MR. ALLEN: Excuse me. 
20 THE COURT: I can't hear you. 
21 Tl:'E BAILIFF: Stand UD. 
22 MR. ALLEN: I apologize, Your Honor. The defendant 
23 has the right at the time he is arrested not to say anythina. 
24 He has the right not to have that used against hiri. Now counse 
25 has repeatedly tried to infer some kind of negative inference 
HAL R REES 






from that. Now it's possible that he had this experience 
and has been told by attorneys not to speak and I think he 
has a right not to speak and not to use that against him. 
THE COURT: That's correct, but he asked if this was 
the first time he has ever told his story. I think that's 
a proper question. That's the substance of his question. 
MR. PATTERSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: I think that's a proper question. 
Q. (By Mr. Patterson:) Answer the que_stion, Mr. Velarde. 
A. What are you referring to? 
O. Okay. You ctose, you answered certain ouestions from 
Officer Nelson, did you not? 
k No, I never. 
Q. You never answered any questions that Mr. Nelson 
asked you? 
No, I didn't. It states in the police report that 
there was, I answered no questions. 
95 
.8 I'm not asking you about the police report, Mr. 
.9 I'm simply asking you, di-:1 you ans1-1er any questions Officer Nelson 
!O asked you? 
!l MR. ALLEN: I believe he's answered that question, 
22 Your Honor. 
l>. No, I said no. I don't know how Many times I have 
got to say no. 
25 THE COURT: Mr. Velarde, you just answer the question 
HAL R. REES 










A. No, no. 
Q. Mr. Velarde, this is the first time that you hii\·r, 
elected to state your version of what in Salt 
County and in Morgan County, is that true? 
A. Well yea, it's the first time I have said anythinq 













7 And that, and notwithstanding that this offense 
8 occurred in excess of six weeks ago? 
9 A. What do you mean by that? 
10 Q. six weeks you have chosen to remain silent and 
11 to utilize just today to say --
12 A. I have talked to my attor!'ley. 
13 Q. what has occurred. 
14 I have no further questions. 
15 THE COURT: Mr. Allen. 
16 REDIRECT EXA!1PJ.Z\TI01\J 
17 BY MR. .Z\L!-EN: 
18 Q. Mr. Velarde, you have come in contact with the 
19 police before, is that correct? 
20 A. Yes, I have. 
21 Q. And have you had opportunity to be reoresented by 
22 counsel before: is that correct? 
23 A. Yes, I have. 
24 Q. You recognize that you have a riqht not to tell the 
25 police anything? 
HAL R. REES 


























to be argued to you and the Court has some other instructions 
to read. I'm not going to thrill you with me reading those 
that I have already read, but we will send them with you in 
the jury room so you have them to read and go over. 
Each of the parties have rested their cases and after 
I read the instructions, they each have an opportunity to speak 
to you concerning their case. 
Starting with instruction number eight, I 
seven. 
102 
10 (Whereupon the Judge read the remaining jury instructi ns 
11 to the jury after which the following proceedings were had:) 
i 12 
I 
/13 BY MR. P.".TTERSON: 
CLOSING ARGUMENTS 
14 MR. PATTERSON: This is the time for closing argument 
15 By law, both of the parties are allowed to do so at this time. 
16 And after we have been given it, I have a chance to go again. 
17 I am going to speak for ten minutes and I am going to speak 
18 for five minutes after Mr. Allen takes his time. 
19 We have two witnesses to testify because, unfortunate 
20 so, because nobody saw the actual taY.ing. We did know where 
21 the truck was an hour later. It was some 17 blocks removed fro. 
n the theft site. How did it get there? Well we have two 
23 witnesses and two witnesses only and that's Mr. Pentz and 
that's Mr. Velarde. You are going to have to believe in whole 
or reject in whole either what Mr. Pentz has said or what 
HAL R. REES 
Office: 867·2211 Registered Professional Reporter Res: 829-3976 
pa..s.e... JS-1 
I. 
l Mr. Velarde said. People like you and me tend lo take differin. 
2 view of the same and tend to reconcile. Vle assun•c· l'1at pcopl" 
3 talk to us in good faith. \ve assume that peo!-'le Lllk lo ue; 
4 honestly. But, Ladies and Gentlemen, you can't clo U1.Jt here. 
5 Either Mr. Pentz or Mr. Velarde has intentionally lied under 
6 oath. One of these gentlemen has intentionally misrepresented 
7 the truth. One of them does know what indeed did happen. One 
8 of them-has chosen to lie about it. So is no 9rey area 
9 here, it's an either-or. 
10 Now is Mr. Velarde truthful? I ask you to consider 
11 these factors. Why did he immediately go into the search 
12 position upon being woken up by Officer Nelson? tlov: Officer 
13 Nelson was, saw he was intoxicated. Officer Nelson is a 
14 professional police officer. Officer Nelson doesn't have a 
15 saw to grind. He's not on the line, his reputation is not on 
16 the line. He has very accurately represented to you what 
17 happened. I'm not going to go through the testimonv except 
18 to say that Nelson read Mr. Velarde the Warning 
19 to him some ten minutes after he arrived. And after the 
20 Miranda Warnings were read, Officer Nelson said, "Who's truck 
21 is this?" Mr. Velarde said, "I don't know." He didn't say 
22 I'm not going to talk to you, I don't like police officers, 
23 he said, "Why are you in the truck?" "I don't know, I can't 
24 remember." It wasn't ''I can't remember." "I can't remem'::lcr 
25 Now, I can't remember is a world apart from what 
HAL R. REES 
Office: 867-2211 Registered Professional Reporter Res 829-3976 
104 
Velarde now says. Why does Mr. Velarde remember now but he didn't 
2 remember then? Why the immediate search position against the 
truck? I know Mr. Velarde doesn't like police officers, let's 
assume he doesn't. Why does Mr. Velards have to assume that 
Mr. Nelson knows anything? In fact Velarde says he is 
6 innocent. 
Now why does an innocent man go into a search against 
8 a truck? In that basis, why did Mr. Pentz call the Sheriff's 
9 Office? If Mr. Velarde's statement is true, Mr. Pentz had 
10 everything to lose because Mr. Velarde was drunk. On what 
11 basis could Mr. Pentz fairly think that Mr. Velarde would ever 
recognize him again? Why does Mr. Pentz in effect put himself 
iU back into the boiling water by calling the Sheriff's Office, 
I 
114 telling him where to go and then unlike Mr. Velarde, relate 
15 to the officerwhat happened? Mr. Pentz in effect was messing 
16 with success then wasn't he. Why would he do that? Why would 
17 Mr. Pentz in effect return to the scene to invite an arrest 
18 and to invite felony charges being filed. Mr. Pentz didn't 
19 have anything to lose. He was being truthful. Mr. Pentz, if he 
20 had in fact stollen that vehicle, should have W3lked away into 
21 the night and simply disappeared, never heard from again, never 
22 seen again, but he didn't do it. Very inconsistent. 
23 And why does Mr. Velarde wait six weeks? Why not 
24 at the accident scene say, r·•m innocent? Mr. Pentz had that 
25 not me. You have got the wrong man. I don't even know how to 
HAL R. REES 





' ' ' I 
I 
1 drive a four-speed. What's wrong with the outrage? M"· h".1vcn:, 
2 there, according to Mr. Velarde, the guilty man is walkiny 
3 away. But Mr. Velarde said, I can't remember. l'lhere is the· 
4 outrage? Think about it, you know . 
5 There you are, there Mr. Velarde is. Hey, you have 
6 got the wrong man. I don't even drive a four-speed. I didn't 
7 even know where Morgan is. Why am I here? !'lhere is the outrag o 
8 Where is the indignation? Where is t'i.e sense of being victimiz c' 
9 Thank you. 
10 THE COURT: Mr. Allen. 
11 CLOSl'lG ARGU'1ENTS 
12 BY MR. ALLEN: 
13 MR. ALLEN: Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury. This 
14 will be my last opportunity to talk to you. As I spoke in the 
15 opening statement that I made, what you have to do here is 
16 determine if the State has proven their case beyond a reasonabl 
17 doubt. And what could cause a reasonable doubt in that could 
18 the fact that the man was supposed, according to the State, to 
19 have driven that truck all the way from Salt Lake to Morgan 
20 and was too drunk to walk? Could that create a reasonable 
21 doubt? Could the fact that the truck wound up in Morgan, a 
22 place where Mr. Velarde would have no probable reason for 
23 wanting to go to, could that create a reasonable doubt? Could 
24 the fact that Mr. Velarde has testified that he has trouble 
25 with four-speed transmissions in anywav, could that create a 
HAL R REES 
Office: 867-2211 Registered Professional Reporter Res: 829·3976 
1 He has stated forthright that he was absolutely drunk. He 
2 stated forthrightly that he had problems before. He tells us 
that he had a felony conviction before that he pled guilty 
4 to meaning that at the time when he was charged with tlia t 
6 crime, he felt he was guilty and went ahead anct pled guilty. 
6 Here he is today, before you, pleading not guilty, 
7 putting this case before the jury for you to make the determin-.. 
8 ation whether the State has proven beyond a reasonable.doubt 
9 that he stole a truck. 
10 I think, in reiterating in closing, the reasonable 
11 doubts are everywhere in this case. The fact that Mr. 
12 is to drunk to drive is unusual enough, but the fact that he is 
13 too drunk to drive and then manages to drive all the way up 
14 to Morgan County where he was found in the passenger side of 
15 the truck, creates more than a reasonable doubt in my min<l. 
16 And my client, Mr. Velarde and I ask you to look at the 
17 evidence and determine that there is not sufficient evidence 
18 to convict my client of any crime and we ask you to find him 
19 not guilty. 
20 
21 
THE COURT: Mr. Patterson. 
REBUTTAJ, ARGUMENT 
22 BY MR. PATTERSON: 
23 MR. Ladies and Gentlemen, you siMply take 
24 a look at Mr. Pentz and take a look at Mr. Velarde and tell 
25 me why a guilty man .would call the police and then give his 
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1 witness statement and appear at trial. I think we are watching 1 
2 either too much TV or we are too fascinated hy complicaterl plotc ? 
3 But human nature is not such that Mr. Pentz woulcl put cvcrytlti11 
4 on the line to put himself back into a crime with no expcctatio 4 





















pure indignation will say hey, wait a minute, let's get this 6 
story straight. He picked me up in Salt Lake. I passed out. 7 
He drove me here. I didn't ever have that truck. 8 
But instead he said, when nfficer Nelson asked him 9 
who's truck it is, I don't know, I can't remember. Ahh, why 1( 
are you in it? I don't know, I can't remember. He does. 1 
Now, we have a lot of, "what if's". We only have 1 
two stories. It's very simple. This isn't a complex case at 
all. Just simply two stories. You either believe Mr. PPntz 
or you believe Mr. Velarde because one of them is lying . 
Mr. Velarde, by his own testimony, understands he is 
going no further than 6th South or something like Kaysville; 
that at 6th South when he asked, his response is to pass out. 
Now he has never seen Mr. Pentz before in his life and he 
apparently would have to perceive himself in sort of a helpless 
situation if we review Mr. Velarde's testimony, but he sure is 
relaxed about it. He has no idea where he is going or why, 
where he is being taken to or what is in store for him so he 
just passes out. 
I summize that didn't happen. Mr. Velarde knew wliere 
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he was going and he was driving. 
Perhaps you, of the jury, and counsel, don't put in 
a 24 hour day the way Mr. Velarde, Mr. Pentz do. we are not 
4 here to pass upon the quality of Mr. Pentz, you know, daily life 
5 style or of Mr. Velarde and by that I mean we are not here to 
6 admire Mr. Pentz or admire Mr. Velarde. We are simply here 
7 to hear a fact pattern and decide who is being truthful. 
8 Mr. Velarde has no choice but to say what he did on 
9 the witness stand today or he is guilty. Mr. Pentz had a 
10 choice of never to call the Sheriff's Office and just walk 
11 away because by that man's testimony, he never saw Pentz before 
12 wouldn't have recognized him, and would have certainly never 
13 planned on seeing him again. And why was Pentz so doing and 
14 being nervous? 
15 Thank you. 
16 (Whereupon, the Bailiff was sworn to take the jury to 
17 the jury room and watch over them during their deliberations.) 
18 THE COURT: Now the Bailiff will escort you to the 
19 jury room where you may commense your deliberations. You should 
20 first choose one of your members as the foreman to act as a 
21 presiding officer. The forman should sign whatever verdict you 
22 have agreed upon. When you agreed upon the verdict and it's bein 
23 signed and dated, notify the Bailiff that you agree. Do not 
reveal your verdict to the Bailiff. The foreman will keep the 
25 verdict in his possession or her possession until such time as 
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